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Research indicates that there is a specially adapted, hard-wired brain circuit, the security
motivation system, which evolved to manage potential threats, such as the possibility of
contamination or predation. The existence of this system may have important implications
for policy-making related to security. The system is sensitive to partial, uncertain cues of
potential danger, detection of which activates a persistent, potent motivational state of
wariness or anxiety. This state motivates behaviors to probe the potential danger, such as
checking, and to correct for it, such as washing. Engagement in these behaviors serves
as the terminating feedback for the activation of the system. Because security motivation
theory makes predictions about what kinds of stimuli activate security motivation and
what conditions terminate it, the theory may have applications both in understanding how
policy-makers can best influence others, such as the public, and also in understanding the
behavior of policy-makers themselves.
Keywords: potential danger, precautionary behavior, security motivation, risk, decision making,
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD)
INTRODUCTION
The world in which we currently live confronts people responsible
for making decisions about security with very challenging issues.
These issues call for sophisticated logical and statistical analy-
sis, detection and forecasting systems, cost-benefit analysis, and
the like. However, the crux of security is the necessity of dealing
with the prospect of potential danger. Because potential dangers
have had very substantial consequences for reproductive fitness
for many thousands of years, evolution has shaped brain systems
specially adapted formanaging them. Thus, in addition to the log-
ical armamentarium that present-day decision-makers bring to
issues of security, they inevitably bring the intuitions and moti-
vations that are generated by a biologically ancient, “hard-wired”
system.
This potential-threat system in the brain has been termed the
defense system (Trower et al., 1990) and the hazard-precaution
system (Boyer and Lienard, 2006). In our own work, we have
called it the security motivation system (Szechtman and Woody,
2004). Our research investigating this system has focused on
its role in everyday circumstances, such as behavior to manage
threats of contagion due to dirt and germs, and in pathological
variants of these behaviors, such as the compulsive hand-washing
seen in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). However, it is
likely that the influence of the security motivation system extends
well beyond such relatively mundane circumstances. The purpose
of this perspective article is to explain briefly what we know about
the security motivation system and to advance the following
question: Does this biological system affect policy-making about
security in important ways? We hope to stimulate the thinking
of researchers who investigate security-related decision-making,
in particular by sketching some of the kinds of hypotheses that
could be examined in such research.
PROPERTIES OF THE SECURITY MOTIVATION SYSTEM
The security motivation system is hypothesized to be a reason-
ably distinct module in the brain, which evolved to be specially
adapted for handling potential threats (Tooby and Cosmides,
1990, 1992, 2006; Trower et al., 1990; Pinker, 1997). Such a mod-
ule has several key characteristics. First, it is dedicated to the
detection of particular types of stimuli as input, rapidly pro-
cessing a special class of information of particular relevance for
survival. Second, when activated, it functions as a motivational
system, driving relevant responses (Kavaliers and Choleris, 2001).
Third, its output consists of a characteristic set of species-typical
behaviors, and engagement in these behaviors plays a crucial role
in terminating the activation of the module.
TYPE OF STIMULI THAT ACTIVATE THE SYSTEM
Research on how animals manage the threat of predation illumi-
nates the kinds of stimuli that activate the security motivation
system. Animals use subtle, indirect cues of uncertain signifi-
cance as indicators of potential danger (Blanchard and Blanchard,
1988; Lima and Bednekoff, 1999). Evaluating these indirect cues
of potential danger is quite different from recognizing imminent
danger, such as the actual presence of a predator, and has been
characterized in terms of “labile perturbation factors” (Wingfield
et al., 1998) and “hidden-risk mechanisms” (Curio, 1993). In
short, the securitymotivation system is tuned to partial, uncertain
cues of potential threat, rather than the recognition of imminent
danger.
NATURE OF ACTIVATION OF THE SYSTEM
Studies of the threat of predation show that relatively weak cues
readily activate vigilance and wariness (Brown et al., 1999). In
addition, this activation ebbs only slowly (Wingfield et al., 1998),
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even if no further, confirming cues follow (Masterson and
Crawford, 1982; Curio, 1993; Marks and Nesse, 1994). This pro-
tracted activation motivates security-related behaviors. In short,
weak cues can readily activate the security motivation system, and
once activated, it has a protracted half-life and drives behavior.
OUTPUT BEHAVIORS AND TERMINATION OF ACTIVATION OF THE
SYSTEM
The resulting acts consist of precautionary behaviors, which
include probing the environment, checking, and surveillance to
gather further information about any potential risks (Blanchard
and Blanchard, 1988; Curio, 1993). They also include corrective
or prophylactic behaviors, such as washing, that would lessen
the effects of the danger if it were to eventuate. Of particular
importance, we have characterized security-related behavior as
“open-ended,” meaning that the environment does not normally
provide a clear terminating stimulus to signal goal attainment
(Szechtman andWoody, 2004). For example, if checking does not
reveal the presence of a predator, this is not a clear indication of
reduced risk (Curio, 1993); that is, the success of precautionary
behavior is a non-event. Consequently, we proposed that it is the
engagement in security-related behavior in itself that terminates
security motivation. In short, activation of the security motiva-
tion system elicits precautionary behavior, and the system uses
these actions themselves as the terminator of the motivation.
NEURAL AND PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS AND EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE FOR THE SECURITY MOTIVATION SYSTEM
We have proposed a fairly detailed neuroanatomical-circuit
model for the security motivation system, which is based on
functional loops consisting of cascades of cortico-striato-pallido-
thalamo-cortical connections (Alexander et al., 1986; Brown and
Pluck, 2000), with feedback connections from the brainstem
to terminate activity in these loops (Szechtman and Woody,
2004; Woody and Szechtman, 2011). We have also described
the proposed physiological mechanisms of the security moti-
vation system, which involve regulation of the parasympathetic
nervous system and activation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-
adrenocortical (HPA) axis (Woody and Szechtman, 2011).
We have demonstrated that activation and subsequent deac-
tivation of the security motivation system can be tracked both
with subjective ratings (e.g., anxiety and urge to engage in pre-
cautionary behavior) and also physiological changes, especially
respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA; Porges, 2001, 2007a,b), based
on heart-rate variability (Hinds et al., 2010). Using these mea-
sures, we have conducted a series of experiments that support
the hypotheses that the security motivation system has the afore-
mentioned characteristic properties. First, we have shown that the
system is responsive to relatively weak, uncertain cues for poten-
tial danger (Hinds et al., 2010, Experiment 1). Second, we have
shown that activation of the system, in the absence of subse-
quent precautionary behavior, is persistent over time, dissipating
only very slowly (Hinds et al., 2010, Experiment 2). Third, we
have shown that corrective behavior, such as hand washing in
response to uncertain cues for contamination, deactivates the
system (Hinds et al., 2010, Experiment 1). In contrast to the
deactivating effect of corrective behavior, the security motivation
system, once it has been activated by uncertain cues, is relatively
unresponsive to clear cognitive information that disconfirms the
potential threat (Hinds et al., 2010, Experiment 3). This find-
ing supports the hypothesis that the system is action-oriented,
and engagement in some kind of precautionary behavior plays a
crucial role in turning it off.
In a somewhat parallel series of experiments, we have tested
our hypothesis that OCD represents a dysfunction of the secu-
rity motivation system (Szechtman and Woody, 2004; Woody
and Szechtman, 2005). It is well known that the content of OCD
revolves around issues of potential danger, such as the threat of
contamination or physical harm to oneself or close others (e.g.,
Reed, 1985; Wise and Rapoport, 1989). We hypothesized that in
OCD patients, security motivation is activated in a manner that is
reasonably similar to how it is activated in non-patients; however,
in OCD patients, subsequent precautionary behaviors fail to turn
this activation off in the usual fashion. Thus, once activated, OCD
patients remain preoccupied with issues of potential danger for a
protracted period of time and repeat the precautionary behaviors
over and over again, in an attempt to deactivate the concerns. Our
experimental data support this hypothesis that OCD is a stopping,
rather than a starting, problem (Hinds et al., 2012). In partic-
ular, exposure to uncertain cues for contamination activates the
security motivation system similarly in OCD patients and con-
trol non-patients, as indexed by both subjective measures and
RSA. However, a subsequent fixed period of hand-washing, which
returns the non-patients to baseline, has no significant effect on
the activation levels of the OCD patients.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SECURITY MOTIVATION SYSTEM
The security motivation system would be expected to have some
important characteristics that are common to evolved, special-
purpose modules. One important characteristic of such modules
is that they tend to be encapsulated, operating relatively automat-
ically and autonomously, and their internal computations are not
accessible to introspection (Fodor, 1983). That is, they operate
largely in the background, apart from the realm of volitionally
directed formal logic, and their outputs become evident to the
individual intuitively as feelings.
This distinction between a feeling-based system and rational
analysis may not always be readily evident in everyday circum-
stances, because normally the two kinds of output are reasonably
well aligned. However, the distinction becomes extremely strik-
ing in OCD. OCD patients feel driven to continue their obsessive
concerns about potential danger and to repeat precautionary
behaviors, such as checking or washing, even though at a ratio-
nal level they find these concerns and behaviors to be excessive,
illogical, and even absurd (Hollander et al., 1996). Indeed, OCD
demonstrates that an intuitive, feeling-based module like the
security motivation system is very powerful and can override the
rational control of behavior.
The relatively automatic, intuitive, feeling-based operation of
the security motivation system corresponds with what Kahneman
(2011) has termed System 1, in contrast to the formal logic of
System 2. What is important to appreciate is that even though
the intuitive feelings generated by the security motivation sys-
tem are vivid, immediate, and phenomenologically compelling
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to the individual, they are not the same as objective reality, nor
are they necessarily closely aligned to conclusions derivable from
formal logic. They are, in essence, intuitions that worked well in
our remote past but may have limited applicability to any specific,
current set of circumstances.
DOES THIS BIOLOGICAL SYSTEM INFLUENCE
POLICY-MAKING ABOUT SECURITY IN IMPORTANT WAYS?
The nature of the security motivation systemmay have important
implications for policy makers wishing to involve others, such as
the public, in the detection and appraisal of potential threat, as
well as to shape their perceptions and get their support for policy
initiatives. Even though the security motivation system is sensi-
tive to the detection of slight, partial, uncertain cues, it evolved
in such a way that it is tuned more to certain types of stimuli,
but not others. It seems clear that the security motivation sys-
tem is particularly sensitive to concrete and surprising or novel
changes in the environment, and relatively insensitive to relatively
abstract and gradual changes (which can become familiar and
therefore lack novelty). Thus, for example, hearing some details
of the latest terrorist attack, even if it occurred at a distant loca-
tion, is likely to much more readily elicit activation of the security
motivation system than is information about global warming,
which is relatively abstract and involves very slow change. In addi-
tion, because activation of the security motivation system leads to
probing for further information, there is a positive feedback cycle
in which further concrete details are added, magnifying the initial
difference.
Let’s examine the case in which it seems relatively difficult
influence others to take potential threats seriously, such as global
warming. We would advance the hypothesis that for stimuli to
be regarded as possible indicators of potential threat, they must
elicit the feeling of a potential threat—that is, anxiety, and wari-
ness, which is the indication that the security motivation system is
activated. In other words, if the indicators of a putative potential
threat fail to evoke the emotional resonance of potential threats,
then the potential threat in question will not be perceived as cred-
ible. Because the cues for the potential threat of global warming
are abstract, distant, and involve very gradual change, they do
not resemble the types of cues the security motivation system is
designed to respond to.Wewould suggest that this is why the issue
strikes many people as “academic” or merely political—the rel-
evant cues lack the feeling of potential threats, because they do
not readily activate the security motivation system. One solution
may be to use the arts to help supply the missing emotion. This
is a possibility that is currently being explored in many ways by
artists—film-makers, painters, writers, and so on—and directors
of art museums; the idea, in the words of a director of New York’s
Museum of Modern Art, is to “touch and disturb” people and get
them engaged (Economist, 2013, July 20–26).
The opposite type of case is one in which stimuli too readily
activate the security motivation system, as with some terror-
ist incidents, in which the attention-grabbing qualities of some
potential dangers may have little relation to and even interfere
with objective analysis of their severity or likelihood. To inject
these more abstract considerations into the operation of the
security motivation system requires connecting System 2, which
handles abstract ideas, to System 1, which is based on concrete
stimuli. We would hypothesize that to be effective, information
putting potential threats into a broader critical perspective needs
to come early, prior to exposure to the potential-threat stimuli.
According to our model of the functional components of the
security motivation system (Szechtman and Woody, 2004), such
information can come into play at the stage of appraisal of poten-
tial danger, which integrates internal factors, such as plans, with
external factors, such as concrete stimuli. In contrast, our work
suggests that once the security motivation system is activated, it is
not affected much by further cognitive information, but instead
becomes highly action-oriented, driving, for example, checking
and corrective behaviors rather than reappraisal (Hinds et al.,
2010).
Of course, the security motivation system theory may have
implications for policy-makers themselves, rather than simply
those they hope to influence. For everyone, this system is intuitive
and feeling-based, operating at least somewhat independently of
rational analysis. Because the emotions that the system gener-
ates evolved to address crucial survival issues, they are powerful
and strongly motivating. Thus, it is natural for decision-makers
engaged with an issue of potential danger to be guided by their
“gut feelings,” which are more vivid and pressing than the details
of rational analysis. Unfortunately, feelings of potential threat
(wariness and anxiety) are likely to map imperfectly onto the real-
ity of potential threat. In a related vein, Schneier (2008) pointed
out: “Security is both a feeling and a reality. And they are not
the same.” A rational analysis of potential danger would need
to take account of probabilities and other statistical information,
but the intuitive operations of the security motivation system do
not work this way. According to Suskind (2006, p. 62), as Vice
President, Dick Cheney took the position that potential threats
should not be evaluated according to “our analysis, or finding a
preponderance of evidence,” but instead by a “one-percent doc-
trine”: if there is any chance of the reality of the threat, “we have
to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response.” This position
has a gut-intuitive appeal, in that fragmentary cues suggesting any
potential of threat activate security motivation, which in turn nat-
urally drives action. However, this is unlikely to be an adequate
basis for making very difficult decisions about how to allocate
resources to security-related behavior vs. other important goals.
We would also hypothesize that work circumstances that
divide up the tasks involved in managing potential threats may
tend to disrupt the stopping mechanism of the security moti-
vation system—because, for example, the policy makers do not
get to carry out any of the protective actions themselves. We
would propose that this problem can lead some agencies work-
ing on security issues to function in a way that is analogous to
our characterization of OCD—namely, too much can seem like
too little (Hinds et al., 2012). Consider, for instance, that between
2001 and 2013, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
court of 14 judges in the USA approved 20,909 requests to mon-
itor individuals or search properties, and turned down only 10.
Recently, they apparently ruled that all American phone calls
should be considered “relevant” to the investigation of terrorist
threats (Economist, 2013, July 13–19). The reason why everything
may come to seem relevant may be that the stopping function
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of the security motivation system is based not on cognitive clo-
sure, but instead on concrete action, and those setting policy may
not be involved in protective and corrective action at all (e.g.,
searching and evaluating records).
There are also other implications of the idea that the pre-
cautionary behaviors are crucial for turning off security moti-
vation. The security motivation system operates according to
what Kahneman (2011) terms System 1 processes. Unfortunately,
as Kahneman has very convincingly demonstrated, System 1 is
prone to substituting something that has only the form or appear-
ance of a solution in place of a real solution, especially if the better
solution would be more difficult. Thus, although turning off the
anxiety of security motivation requires action, the details of what
is done may not matter as much to the system. Possibly for this
reason, policy-making responses to potential threats often seem
only to be reactive, rather than proactive. For example, to prevent
another shoe-bombing attempt, it is decided that all passengers’
shoes must be inspected. Such a prescribed set of actions may be
effective in calming security motivation for both policy-makers
and the public. However, such a solution seems to ignore the fact
that biological agents (even germs) change strategies, so that what
would have worked against them in the past may not do so in the
future.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing hypotheses illustrate just a few of the ways in
which the security motivation system theory could be used to
generate interesting hypotheses for research on the psychology of
security-related policy-making. Although these hypotheses need
to be evaluated in future research, we hope they provide a con-
vincing case that the security motivation system theory offers
a novel, generative framework for advancing our understand-
ing of policy-making processes related to security and potential
danger.
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